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Intertextuality is a concept often associated
with postmodernism, more particularly with
that sphere of postmodernism where literature
encounters critical theory.1  In many respects,
and especially in the field of literature and
poetics with which I am concerned, post-
modernism can be viewed as a development
of modernism which manifested itself during
the first decades of the 20th century, in the
years preceding and following the great
fracture of the first World War. Modernism
was characterized by the loss of stable values,
by the loss of belief in the possibility of an
objective truth and in the validity of totalizing
ideologies, by the rejection of formal aesthetic
theories, the emphasis given to subjectivity,
to the discontinuous and the fragmentary, also
by the place given to reflexivity and self-
consciousness in the production of texts.
Postmodernism, I would suggest, merely went
further in the same direction, sometimes with an
added dose of scepticism and irony, mostly
perhaps as a consequence of new developments
like consumerism, the new technologies,
globalization, but to me there was no new
epistemological rupture like the one that took
place with the emergence of modernism.
What I will try to show in this lecture is that
though the word for it had not yet been coined,
the workings of intertextuality were  already
being explored by such modernists as T. S. Eliot
and David Jones. In that respect also, there is
an undeniable continuity between modernism
and postmodernism, and I cannot imagine that
if we have truly entered a new age “beyond
postmodernism” we can do without the key
concept of intertextuality to account for that
all-important dimension of our experience as
readers of literary texts, which we could call
“the memory of literature”.2
* * *
In the Preface to The Anathemata, first published
half a century ago, David Jones wrote, probably
with reference to “the signs of the times” (Matt
XVI, 3): “The times are late and getting later,
not by decades but by years and months,” and
complained that this “tempo of change,” making
“schemes and data out-moded and irrelevant
overnight,” created special difficulties for the
artist, which he then tried to explain:
The artist deals wholly in signs. His signs must
be valid, that is valid for him and, normally,
for the culture that has made him. But there
is a time factor affecting these signs. If a1
  A first version of this article, “The Intertextual
Effect”, was published in Symbolism, An International
Annual of  Critical Aesthetics (New York: AMS Press,
2005), 35–60.
2
 See Tiphaine Samoyault, L’Intertextualité. Mémoire
de la littérature (Paris: Nathan, 2001).
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requisite now-ness is not present, the sign,
valid in itself, is apt to suffer a kind of
invalidation. This presents most complicated
problems to the artist working outside a
reasonably static culture-phase.3
If I choose to start these reflections on
intertextuality with David Jones, it is not only
because he belonged to the generation of men
whose fate it was to experience two World Wars
and become so much involved in the history of
the 20th century, and who could have said with
Abraham Cowley that “a warlike, various, and
tragical age is best to write of, but worst to write
in,”4 but also because, in his way, he was a poet
who strongly believed in the supreme importance
of tradition, if not explicitly in the intertextual
solidarity of texts, for the good reason that the
word “intertextuality” had not yet been coined.
The opening sentence of his Preface to The
Anathemata is a quotation from Nennius: “I have
made a heap of all I could find,” and some ten
pages later he writes: “I believe that there is, in
the principle that informs the poetic art,
something which cannot be disengaged from
the mythus, deposits, matière, ethos, whole res
of which the poet is himself a product,”5  clearly
a way of pointing to the importance of culture a
good deal broader and more far-reaching than
what T. S. Eliot had said a few years earlier
about our common heritage, in Notes towards
the Definition of Culture:
The Western world has its unity in this heritage,
in Christianity and in the ancient civilisations of
Greece, Rome and Israel, from which, owing
to two thousand years of Christianity, we trace
our descent.6
By then Eliot was not only “classical in literature,
royalist in politics, and Anglo-Catholic in religion,”
as he had described himself: he had also become
the figurehead of cultural conservatism. Yet there
is no great difference in effect between David
Jones’s desire for a “reasonably static culture-
phase” and Eliot’s insistence upon the necessity
to preserve the unity of our cultural heritage,
both classical and Christian.
Now, is there any stability left in the world
we live in, in that “botched civilization” which
Ezra Pound (with all the dead of WWI in mind)
described long ago as “an old bitch gone in the
teeth” – “two gross of broken statues” and “a
few thousand battered books”?7 Is there a way
to reconcile the views of such men as David
Jones and T. S. Eliot on tradition and culture with
the radically subversive discourse held by the
poststructuralists and neo-postmodernists when
the issue of intertextuality became all the rage,
first in Paris among the intellectual circles of the
Left Bank, in the late 1960s, and soon afterwards
among the avant-garde of American literary
theorists and language philosophers? Is
intertextuality, now that  we tend to think that
we are beyond postmodernism, still a relevant
issue? Is it of any real critical use? Is it still being
discussed, or is it simply viewed as a well-
established irrefutable concept by some, and
flatly rejected by others as an outdated craze, a
vogue concept, today to be ignored? These are
some of the questions that I wish to address in
this lecture. I will first look back upon the origin
of the concept, try to clarify the main issues at
stake, and observe its successive theoretical
avatars. I will also point out the fact that the
epistemological modernist rupture of the 1920s
was the occasion for the production of works
and reflections, especially by T. S. Eliot, that are
3
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the forerunners of those produced by the
intertextualists of our postmodernity. I will then
take a number of examples in order to illustrate
the way in which the notion of intertextuality can
be tested in situ. Those examples will also help
me to introduce some of the conclusions I have
come to, and point to the directions in which
further theoretical explorations should perhaps be
made. Let it be clear that as an intertextualist
myself, though no hardliner, I lay no claim to any
originality, especially in my attempts to
circumscribe the problem, clarify definitions,
defend and illustrate the concept of intertextuality.8
There is no doubt that this concept was not
created ex nihilo out of the fertile brain of Julia
Kristeva. But she was the first to use it in print
in an article on Bakhtin, whom she had read in
Russian while still a student in Bulgaria, before
she settled in France.9 The late 1960s were in
Paris the years when the human sciences made
a quantum leap forward in all directions, with a
number of hyper-active, avant-gardist, mostly
leftist intellectuals  trying to apply the theories
and methodologies of those sciences to the study
of literature. Foremost were the fast-developing
sciences of post-Saussurean linguistics (Roman
Jakobson, Émile Benveniste), post-Freudian
psychoanalysis (Jacques Lacan), semiology
(Roland Barthes) and anthropology (Claude Levi-
Strauss). It was the heyday of theorists, the
years of transition from structuralism to post-
structuralism (not clearly distinguished from
what later came to be known as postmodernism)
with also Jacques Derrida, Louis Althusser,
Michel Foucault all at work, the years when all
forms of authority were challenged (and
sometimes equated) – the Government, de
Gaulle, God, tradition, capitalism, reason, the
reigning doxa, the Establishment, the Author, the
Sorbonne mandarins, the police, etc. They were
the years that led to the great libertarian subversive
explosion of May 1968 in France, echoed and
sometimes amplified in the campuses of many
other countries, notably in Prague, in Belfast,
and in North America.
Any assessment of Julia Kristeva’s launching
of the notion of intertextuality must surely begin
by recalling the social and political context of
the 1960s, but also the specific context of the
development of the problematics of the linguistic
sign, of the concept of enunciation, and of all
the theoretical work done on the notion of
subject, which Kristeva was soon to define as
“le sujet-en-procès” (the subject conceived at
the same time “in the making” and “on trial”).
The order of the sign being radically different
from that of the referent, the sign itself being
split into signifier and signified, the very notion
of meaning as something fixed and stable, even
though it sometimes had to be deciphered, was
lost and replaced by that of the sliding, shifting,
floating signified. Meaning could no longer be
viewed as a finished product, it was now caught
in a process of production. The subject of the
enunciation was to be distinguished from the
subject of the utterance  (sujet de l’énoncé), and
all the imaginary representations of a solid,
identifiable self, or ego, in control of language
and capable of expressing himself, were
denounced and replaced by the notion of a
subject intermittently produced by his parole –
literally spoken by language.
Dealing with intertextuality, it is quite normal
to start with Kristeva, but one of the difficulties
8
 Mention must be made, among the books that I have
found helpful, of Michael Worton and Judith Still, eds.,
Intertextuality, Theories and Practices (Manchester:
Manchester UP, 1990), Heinrich F. Plett, ed., Intertex-
tuality  (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991);
Graham Allen, Intertextuality  (London: Routledge, 2000);
and Vincent B. Leitch, ed., The Norton Anthology
of Theory and Criticism (New York & London:
W. W. Norton & Co., 2001).
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encountered, and also a subsequent source of
confusion, is that Kristeva coined the word in
an article which aimed at introducing the work
of Mikhail Bakhtin in France, or rather the part
of it that was then available, the rest of his œuvre,
though written in the 1920s and 1930s, remaining
unpublished until the 1970s and 1980s. For this
reason, intertextuality was first used with
reference to what Bakhtin calls the dialogic
aspect of language, which “foregrounds class,
ideological and other conflicts, divisions and
hierarchies within society.”10  Bakhtin lays the
emphasis on the otherness of language, on its
internal stratification, on what he calls
polyphony, or heteroglossia – the coexistence
and interplay of several types of discourse
reflecting the social or class dialects and the
different generations and age groups of society.
For Bakhtin “the life of the word is contained in
its transfer from one mouth to another, from
one context to another context, from one social
collective to another.”11 We must remember that
he lived through the years of the Russian
Revolution, and then under Stalin, and his
conception of language is primarily social. His
position is therefore distinct from that of the
formalists and of the followers of Saussurean
linguistics. Characteristically, to him the novel is
the only truly dialogic literary genre, poetry being
single-voiced and essentially monologic. This
alone would lead me to conclude that the version
of intertextuality Bakhtin was made to stand for
(he probably had never heard of, and certainly
never used, the word himself) is not compatible
with the mainstream acception of the concept.
But is there one accepted mainstream
definition of intertextuality? This is most doubtful.
All one can do is observe the way in which
theorists have tried to formulate a definition, note
the variations and differences, and see which
can help us progress in our understanding of
the problem. Riffaterre’s idea that “the term
refers to an operation of the reader’s mind,”12 for
example, confirms the general thesis that
intertextuality means the displacement of critical
interest away from the author, which is what
Umberto Eco does even more explicitly:
It is not true that works are created by their
authors. Works are created by works, texts are
created by texts, all together they speak to each
other independently of the intentions of their
authors.13
So no text exists on its own. It is always
connected to other texts. But to which other
texts specifically? Riffaterre’s definition of the
intertext as “the corpus of texts the reader may
legitimately connect with the one before his
eyes”14 raises more questions (who is to say
what connections are legitimate?) than it provides
answers. The intertext has been compared with
Gilles Deleuze’s notion of the rhizome, a network
that spreads and sprawls, has no origin, no end, no
hierarchical organization. Analogies have also
been made between intertextuality and the
development of hypertexts and of the World
Wide Web, free from the dominant linear,
hierarchical models. Postmodern systems of
communication have thus created the conditions
for what Ihab Hassan calls “the intertextuality
of all life.” For him, “a patina of thought, of
signifiers, of ‘connections’, now lies on
everything the mind touches.”15
10
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Roland Barthes is maybe best remembered,
especially among the anti-intertextualists, for the
polemical title of one of his essays, “The Death
of the Author,” first published as “La Mort de
l’Auteur” in 1968 – a memorable date, if ever
there was one. The title is deliberately
provocative, though what Barthes does in it is
develop further one of the best-known tenets of
the formalist New Critics which W. K. Wimsatt
had brilliantly presented in an epoch-making essay
called “The Intentional Fallacy” (1946).16 The
main ideas which Barthes later developed in his
“Théorie du texte” (a substantial entry of the
Encyclopædia Universalis17) are already
introduced here, and they include a theory of
intertextuality:
We know now that a text is not a line of words
releasing a single “theological meaning” (the
“message” of the Author-God) but a multi-
dimensional space in which a variety of writings,
none of them original, blend and clash. The text
is a tissue of quotations drawn from the
innumerable centres of culture. […] [The writer’s]
only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones
with the others, in such a way as never to rest on
any one of them. Did he wish to express himself,
he ought at least to know that the inner “thing”
he thinks to “translate” is itself a ready-formed
dictionary, its words only explainable through
other words, and so on indefinitely.18
For Barthes, the death of the Author is a logical
necessity, but it should be noted that the writer,
or scriptor, remains. Indeed, as the typographical
rule in French is to capitalize only the first
notional word after the initial article of a title,
“La Mort de l’Auteur” was to be read as distinct
from “La Mort de l’auteur,” a distinction that
was lost in “The Death of the Author.” So when
Barthes concludes that “the birth of the reader
must be at the cost of the death of the Author,”19 it
is clear that he speaks metaphorically and that by
“the Author” he means what he also calls the
“Author-God,” not the scriptor, whose writing
is the “trac[ing] of a field without origin – or
which, at least, has no other origin than language
itself.”20 The death of the Author means that
nobody has authority over the meaning of the
text, and that there is no hidden, ultimate, stable
meaning to be deciphered:
Once the Author is removed, the claim to
decipher a text becomes quite futile. To give a
text an Author is to impose a limit on that text,
to furnish it with a final signified, to close the
writing. Such a conception suits criticism very
well, the latter then allotting itself the important
task of discovering the Author (or his
hypostases: society, history, psyche, liberty)
beneath the work: when the Author has been
found, the text is “explained” – victory to the
critic. […] In the multiplicity of writing, everything
is to be disentangled, nothing deciphered; […]
the space of writing is to be ranged over, not
pierced; writing ceaselessly posits meaning
ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a
systematic exemption of meaning.21
In France, in the Departments of French and of
Modern Languages, where literature was taught,
the death of the Author, the undecidability of
meaning, for ever sliding and elusive, the
declared synchronicity of the intertext, and the
undermining of any stable knowledge of the
literary text were viewed as both dangerously
subversive and absurdly nonsensical by many,
though adopted enthusiastically by some,
especially among the younger generation of
teachers (to which I then belonged). There were
16
 W. K. Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the
Meaning of Poetry (The University of Kentucky Press,
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18 The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism,
1468.
19 Ibid., 1470.
20 Ibid., 1468.
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also people who were prepared to compromise
and, though they found the new theories
excessive in their formulation, they did not find
them quite so revolutionary. After all, they said,
intertextuality is what we have been practising
all the time, and they remembered the wisdom
of Solomon saying: “The sun also ariseth, and
the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place
where he arose, […] and there is no new thing
under the sun,”22 and so were heartened as they
remembered Hemingway (The Sun Also Rises),
and then John Donne, because Hemingway had
also borrowed from “never send to know for
whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee” (for the
title of For Whom the Bell Tolls). Tracing
influences and filiations, finding allusions,
references, quotations and borrowings had
always been the pursuit of literary scholars, and
imitatio veterum had been the basis of classical
poetics. What had Montaigne done in his Essays
but rewrite and comment the writings of writers
before him – Montaigne who seems even to
have coined for the purpose of the intertextualists
of the future the lovely nonce-word “s’entre-
gloser” which Littré collected in his Dictionnaire
de la langue française (1863–1872)? This is
what Montaigne wrote: “Il y a plus affaire à
interpreter les interpretations qu’à interpreter les
choses, et plus de livres sur les livres que sur un
autre subject ; nous ne faisons que nous entre-
gloser.”23
A good example of the moderate – some
would call it watered-down – approach to
intertextuality is to be found in the definition
added in 1997 to the second edition of the OED,
now available on line: “The need for one text
to be read in the light of its allusions to and
differences from the content or structure of
other texts; the (allusive) relationship between
esp. literary texts,” a definition characteristically
followed, among the chosen examples, by a
remark of the nothing-new-under-the-sun type
by George Steiner:
1989 G. STEINER Real Presences II. iv. 85 Are
all theories of hermeneutics and “intertextuality”
–  a characteristic piece of current jargon which
signals the obvious truth that, in Western
literature, most serious writing incorporates,
cites, denies, refers to previous writing – a waste
product?
By a commodius vicus of recirculation, Steiner,
Western literature and tradition bring me back
to Eliot (acronymed as TSE – or “Thomas
Stearns and Environs” for the benefit of the
Joyceans among you24), not the cultural
Conservative and ageing senior member of the
post WWII literary Establishment, but the
modernist poet of The Waste Land, a poem in
which the key elements of “title, motto and
concluding formula represent quotations” (with
Malory, Petronius and the Upanishads as pre-
texts).25 Indeed, one could easily argue that the
reputation of The Waste Land (like that of Ulysses,
also published in 1922) as a masterpiece of
modernism is due to the fact that it is avowedly
run through by a strong intertextual undercurrent
of quotations and allusions which are only
partially explicated in the seven pages of notes
added by Eliot himself. The end of the poem is a
sort of poetic collage of fragments challenging
any notion of identity, linguistic cohesiveness,
diachronicity, or personal authorship:
22
 Eccles., 1, 5-9.
23
  “There is more to be done interpreting interpretation
than interpreting things, and there are more books on
books than on any other subject; we are for ever
inter-glossing each other.” Translation mine. Montaigne,
Les Essais vol. IV (1802, Paris: Didot, an X), 237.
24 Finnegans Wake opens with the words “riverrun,
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25
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I sat upon the shore
Fishing, with the arid plain behind me
Shall I at least set my lands in order?
London Bridge is falling down falling
down falling down
Poi s’ascose nel foco che gli affina
Quando fiam uti chelidon – O swallow
swallow
Le Prince d’Aquitaine à la tour abolie
These fragments I have shored against my ruins
Why then Ile fit you. Hieronymo’s mad againe.
Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata.
Shantih shantih shantih26
Eliot, not only as a poet but also as a theoretician,
can arguably be said to have been the great
forerunner of intertextuality with the “quasi-
intertextual ideas”27 presented in “Tradition and
the Individual Talent,” published at a time (1919)
when Europe had not yet recovered from the
unprecedented mechanical butchery of the Great
War. A major rupture took place then –
experienced as a social, political, philosophical
and moral crisis – creating the sort of critical
self-consciousness that led to the challenge of
all the commonly accepted  views on language,
literature and the arts, and helped produce the
aesthetic and literary movement later known as
modernism – a movement in which, though the
word had not yet been invented nor the concept
defined, intertextuality was at work. “No poet,
no artist of any art, has his complete meaning
alone,” wrote Eliot,28 and the reason for that is
that all true poets and artists have the historical
sense that makes them aware of the “simultaneous
order” of tradition:
The historical sense involves a perception, not
only of the pastness of the past, but of its
presence; the historical sense compels a man to
write not only with his own generation in his
bones, but with the feeling that the whole
literature of Europe from Homer and within it
the whole of the literature of his own country
has a simultaneous existence and composes a
simultaneous order. The historical sense, which
is the sense of the timeless as well as of the
temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal
together, is what makes a writer traditional.29
The “simultaneous order” of tradition – more
amiably formulated than, but not a far cry
from, the synchronicity of the intertext – is
further developed by Eliot:
What happens when a new work of art is created
is something that happens simultaneously to
all the works of art which preceded it. The
existing monuments form an ideal order among
themselves, which is modified by the introduction
of the new (the really new) work of art among
them.30
Thus the order of tradition is constantly altered,
“the relations, proportions, values of each work
of art toward the whole are readjusted,” and as
a result, Eliot says, whoever has followed him
so far “will not find it preposterous that the past
should be altered by the present as much as the
present is directed by the past.”31
As for the other very sensitive issue of
authorship, Eliot was no man to proclaim the
death of the Author, but the “process of
depersonalization” which he advocates, though
it is not coupled as in Barthes’ article with “the
birth of the reader,” clearly goes in the same
direction. Eliot speaks of “a continual
surrender” of the self. For him “The progress
of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a
continual extinction of personality.”32  In his
26
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29
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effort to explain the impersonality of the
creative process, he first uses the analogy of
the catalyst and the metaphor of the poet’s
mind as “the shred of platinum,” and then,
more simply, he writes:
The poet’s mind is in fact a receptacle for seizing
and storing up numberless feelings, phrases,
images, which remain there until all the particles
which can unite to form a new compound are
present together.33
This last formulation proposed by Eliot, though it
is not couched in the language of modern
linguistics and semiotics, is I believe admittedly
compatible with the idea of the text being a
redistribution of the intertext. It confirms my
opinion that the theory of intertextuality is to be
found in its embryonic form, or read between
the lines, in Eliot’s essay on “Tradition and the
Individual Talent.” To take a final mainstream
attempt at defining the concept, what is there in it
that is incompatible or contradictory with Eliot’s
discourse?
[Intertextuality is] a text’s dependence on prior
words, concepts, connotations, codes, conventions,
unconscious practices, and texts. Every text is an
intertext that borrows, knowingly or not, from the
immense archive of previous culture.34
My conclusion, at this point, is that the raging
polemics of three decades ago have now calmed
down, though I know by experience that they
can easily be resumed whenever the opportunity
arises, especially over the issue of what Derrida
calls “the suspension of meaning and reference”35,
and also over the issue of the author’s intentions.
My conclusion is also that the “plethora of
definitions and redefinitions”36 of the concept of
intertextuality  is to be interpreted as a symptom
of the vital importance of the issues at stake and
of the impossibility of any final knowledge about
them, as they concern, to put it in three simple
words, man, language and the real. I also believe
that the cultural crisis and epistemological rupture
of the 1920s created the conditions for the first
prudent tentative approaches to the concept of
intertextuality which a later generation, in the
1960s and 1970s, were to develop with a typical
passion for theories and abstractions. Lastly, as
I started with reflections by David Jones and
the ageing Eliot, acknowledging the artist’s and
the poet’s dependence upon the otherness of
language and the intertext, whether you call it
tradition or “the immense archive of previous
culture,” is not contradictory with a nostalgia
for a fairly “static culture-phase” or an avowed
preference for the unity of the Western
Christian tradition. Rather than follow those
who try to elaborate theories that are so strict
and abstract that they tend to defeat their own
purpose, I favour the idea that there are many
mansions where intertextuality can help us
approach the truth of man’s relation to language
and the real, and the cause of our love for
literature and poetry. As Graham Allen writes,
“our task is to engage with [intertextuality] as
a split, multiple concept, which poses questions
and requires one to engage with them rather
than forcing one to produce definite
answers.”37
It will appear quite clearly that in the
examples I am now going to give and comment
upon I have to speak in my own name, relying
upon my personal past experience as reader
of poems and teacher of poetry courses. How
else could I engage with intertextuality the way
I now intend to, namely as a dimension of
33
 Eliot, Tradition 1951, 19.
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textuality capable of producing a certain effect
upon the reader – not any reader, not the
average common reader, but a given reader
envisaged in his singularity as subject, that is
to say as subject to, not master of, language?
I will start with “Sad Steps,” a remarkable short
poem (18 lines) by Philip Larkin. Here is the way it
begins – rather crudely, I must admit:
Groping back to bed after a piss
I part thick curtains, and am startled by
The rapid clouds, the moon’s cleanliness.38
“Sad Steps” is a powerful poem on the coming
of age, the moon being “a reminder of the strength
and pain / Of being young,” and of the fact that “it
can’t come again,” with exciting problems of many
kinds, especially in the interpretation of the abrupt
high-flown exclamatory interruption addressed to
the moon: “Lozenge of love! Medallion of art! /
O wolves of memory! Immensements!” A poem I
like, and liked teaching. Now Larkin is known for
his very conservative views on poetry, and there
is a statement he made in 1955 which is relevant
to the question of intertextuality, a notion that
Larkin, of course, rejected:
As a guiding principle I believe that every poem
must be its own sole freshly created universe,
and therefore have no belief in “tradition” or a
common myth-kitty or casual allusions in poems
to other poems or poets, which last I find
unpleasantly like the talk of literary under-
strappers letting you see they know the right
people.39
When I found out that the origin of the rather
intriguing title, “Sad Steps,” was to be found in
sonnet 31 of Sidney’s Astrophel and Stella
(“With how sad steps, O Moone, thou climb’st
the skies, / How silently, and with how wanne a
face!”), I was both pleased and amused: I was
amused to catch Larkin red-handed; I was pleased
to know something I did not know before,
something about the “origin” or “source” of
Larkin’s poem, as there is admittedly a special
satisfaction in obtaining that sort of scholarly
knowledge. I later chanced to find out that
Wordsworth had also taken Sidney’s sonnet as a
starting point for a poem of his own, a sonnet
which begins with the quotation, marked by inverted
commas, of the first two lines of Sidney’s poem. That
made me feel even more knowledgeable, but none
the wiser about “Sad Steps.”40 To put it another way,
I experienced nothing of the specific poetic effect of
intertextuality which has little to do, as I want to
show, with knowledge.
My second example will be different, being a
case of ekphrasis, or “medial substitution,” with
visual signs being replaced by linguistic signs.41
It is found in “The Hunt by Night,” the title poem
of a collection by Derek Mahon, whose epigraph,
“ – UCCELLO, 1465” explicitly refers the reader to
Uccello’s picture now known as The Hunt in the
Forest, the most famous work in the collections
of Italian paintings of the Ashmolean Museum, at
Oxford.42 The structure of Uccello’s painting is
determined by the careful implementation of the
theories of perspective which artists of the Italian
Quattrocento had recently developed after Leon
Battista Alberti and his treatise Della Pittura
(1435). Mahon’s poem also presents a remarkable
formal regularity, the metrical and rhyming patterns
set up at the beginning being maintained
throughout the six stanzas of six lines each. The
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following extract (lines 17–28) gives some idea
of the very special visual pattern of the layout,
as it includes the whole of stanza 4:
The mild herbaceous air
Is lemon-blue,
The glade aglow
With pleasant mysteries,
Diuretic depots, pungent prey;
And midnight hints at break of day
Where among sombre trees,
The slim dogs go
Wild with suspense
Leaping to left and right,
Their cries receding to a point
Masked by obscurities of paint  –
The extract makes a clear reference to Uccello’s
painting, and quite interestingly to the central
vanishing point (“a point / masked by obscurities
of paint”), but in a position which does not
coincide with the centre of the poem – the blank
between stanzas 3 and 4 (“Is lemon-blue /    /
The glade aglow”), as if to mark the radical
incompatibility of the iconic and of the linguistic
semiotic codes. But this is no place to reflect
like Stephen Dedalus at the beginning of
“Proteus” upon the ineluctable modalities of the
visible and of the audible, the nebeneinander and
the nacheindander.43  The question to be posed
is whether the concept of intertextuality has any
relevance here. I believe it does, not so much in
terms of reference, meaning and representation,
but because the poem and the painting are now
both part of the great intertextual symbolic
circulation of signifiers amongst the subjects of
language, which Eliot envisaged as a
“simultaneous order,” and thus both addressed
to the Other. A work of art, moreover, whether
a poem or a painting, is also always inspired by
the Other in any or several of the various forms
it takes – language, culture, the Muse, the
unconscious. There is no doubt that Mahon’s
poem was, and still is, inspired by Uccello’s
painting. Likewise, thanks to the presence of
the past (the synchronicity of the intertext), it
can now be said that Mahon’s poem reciprocally
inspires Uccello’s painting. I can bear witness
to it: last time I was in the Ashmolean Museum
and stood in front of the Hunt in the Forest, it
was for me literally haunted by the lines of
Mahon’s poem.
My next example is “Brother Fire,” a poem
by Louis MacNeice written in 1942, at the time
of the bombings of London, “When our brother
Fire was having his dog’s day / Jumping the
London streets with millions of tin cans / clanking
at its tail.”44 I will leave out Saint Francis of Assisi
and his “Cantico delle Creature,” and simply note
the vacillation produced by the reference to Saint
Francis’ famous text and the integration of the
syntagm “Brother Fire” into the syntactic
cohesiveness of MacNeice’s poem. I will also
leave out the echo I hear in those opening lines,
more and more insistently as I grow older, from
Yeats’s “The Tower”: “What shall I do with this
absurdity –  /…/ Decrepit age that has been tied
to me / As to a dog’s tail?”45 I will concentrate
upon the effect produced by the end of the first
stanza:
 Night after night we watched him slaver
and crunch away
The beams of human life, the tops
of topless towers.46
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The phrase “the tops of topless towers” is a
fine example of an inserted quotation, and it
calls to the reader’s mind some well-known
lines concerning Helen in Marlowe’s Dr
Faustus:
Was this the face that launched
a thousand ships
And burnt the topless towers of Ilium?47
Here the literary intertext mediates a story told
about the origin of history and the burning and
destruction of a city whose better-known  name,
Troy, is heard in the last words of MacNeice’s
“Brother Fire” (“Did we not […] / Echo your
thought in ours? ‘Destroy! Destroy!’”48). For
me,  it cannot fail to call to mind the lines from
Yeats’s “Leda and the Swan” – “The broken
wall, the burning roof and tower / And
Agamemnon dead.”49 Yeats can moreover still
be cited as part of this intertextual circulation if
the reader recalls a similar reference to Marlowe
in “Long-legged Fly”:
That the topless towers be burnt
And men recall that face,
Move most gently if move you must
In this lonely place.50
Who can say what belongs to which poet in this
circulation of signifiers relayed by MacNeice,
Yeats and Marlowe? The answer that I would
like to suggest is that the effect of intertextuality
in this case is, with greater or lesser force, to
defeat the notion of identifiable authorship. To
borrow a line from another poem by Louis
MacNeice, “the topless towers” are now “All
men’s, no man’s, thine, mine,”51 part of what
Roland Barthes calls “un souvenir circulaire”
(a circular memory).52 Even if the reader tries
to stop the intertextual flux that carries it along,
even if he wants to attribute the expression to
one particular poet, or lodge it in the context of
one particular poem, the “topless towers” will
escape, and the signifiers, whether consciously
or unconsciously for him, go back to the dancing
of their silent intertextual round.
The last example I want to use is found in
yet another poem by Louis MacNeice, “The
Sunlight on the Garden,” probably one of the
best-known of the poet’s lyrics and a great
favourite with compilers of anthologies. The
pattern of its four stanzas, their rhythm and
complex rhyming scheme have often been
analysed. Here is the first stanza:
The sunlight on the garden
Hardens and grows cold,
We cannot cage the minute
Within its nets of gold,
When all is told
We cannot beg for pardon.53
The poem progresses and comes to the
passage where it quotes, or indicates the origin
of, the title of the collection, The Earth Compels,
in which it was first published: “The earth
compels, upon it / Sonnets and birds descend.”54
The passage upon which I am going to
concentrate occurs at the end of stanza 3:
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The sky was good for flying
Defying the church bells
And every evil iron
Siren and what it tells:
The earth compels,
We are dying, Egypt, dying
And not expecting pardon,
Hardened in heart anew […]
In the context of MacNeice’s poem, “We are
dying, Egypt, dying” cannot but strike the
reader as an heterogeneous element, even
though it is neatly integrated into the fabric of
the poem (the rhyming scheme, the continuity
of the syntax, even the elegiac theme). The
reader may immediately know the line to be a
quotation because he is quite familiar with the
original text, or he may have only the vague
sense of a distant memory being stirred up in
his mind, or he may simply be lost in perplexity
and bewilderment, his mind a total blank. In
all cases something operates in terms of alterity
alternating with sameness, rupture with
continuity, heterogeneity with homogeneity.
For instance, the personal pronoun “we”
introduced in the first stanza (“We cannot cage
the minute”) which we (as readers) could easily
assume since we could easily be both addresser
and addressee of the utterance, now seems so
alien with “Egypt” named as the addressee (and
addressed in the same way as “my friend,” a
few lines earlier) that we find ourselves
dislodged from our enunciatory position. The
line also produces a major isotopic rupture as
it seems impossible to “make sense” of this
strange line.
As a matter of fact, “We are dying, Egypt,
dying” is borrowed and adapted from Antony’s
dying speech to Cleopatra:
I am dying, Egypt, dying, only
I here importune death a while, until
Of many thousand kisses the poor last
I lay upon thy lips.55
The signifier “Egypt,” though evocative by
itself of Pharaonic splendour and of sorrowful
exile, cannot be separated from the rest of
MacNeice’s line. It is “We are dying, Egypt,
dying” that creates the strange, uncanny,
unheimlich effect, such an effect that even
though I have known this poem and the origin
of the quotation for many years, I still
experience today some of the same sense of
rupture and dislodgement, the same vacillation,
the same sudden exemption (or suspension)
of meaning I experienced when I first read it.
Even the way one is supposed to read the line
is problematic: if in order to integrate it we
follow the metrical pattern of the poem, the
line has to be read as an iambic trimeter, and
so, as one critic suggested, “we read ‘we are’
as approximating to ‘we’re’  as the cadence
demands and as MacNeice himself read it,”
and the first stress falls on “dying;”56 if
however “the ear has incubated a cadence”
(as Heaney says57) and we feel that something
lingers on of the original trochaic rhythm of
the line spoken by Antony, “We” will carry the
first stress. The result, unless we choose to
remain deaf to the conflicting rhythms, is
another wavering between the two readings,
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another sense of estrangement, a pause, and a
further exemption of meaning. What I am trying
to suggest here is that erudition (knowing the
reference made to Shakespeare’s Antony and
Cleopatra) does not put an end to the intertextual
effect, and that it is not enough to fully restore
the continuity and homogeneity of the text. And
the intertextual effect, when it happens, whether
with great force or tenuously, is always
unexpected, uncontrollable and short-lived. It
brings no light nor any knowledge, but takes us
to the edge of something obscure and in-
comprehensible. The intertextual effect is one
of loss – loss of meaning, of control and
identity. It is like what Yeats called “that
something over and above utility, which wrings
the heart,”58 both desirable and feared. It has
to be related to what Jacques Lacan has
theorized as jouissance.
In the short introduction he added to the
fourth edition of The Faber Book of Modern
Verse Peter Porter writes that “we live in a
Permanent Museum, whether we like it or
not,”59 and Plett notes that “an endless ars
combinatoria takes place in what has been
variously termed ‘musée imaginaire’ (Malraux),
‘chambre d’échos’ (Barthes), or ‘Bibliothèque
générale’ (Grivel).”60 Today the times are late
and getting later indeed, but even the ever-
increasing “tempo of change” which David
Jones deplored will not put an end to the
operations of tradition, the workings of
intertextuality, the pursuit of scholars or the
enjoyment, joy, jouissance, experienced by the
lovers of poetic language. Scholars can also
be lovers of language, but in trying to
understand the issues of intertextuality I think
one should very clearly distinguish the
intertextual effect from the type of scholarly
research which aims at elucidating all sources,
tracing all allusions, finding all references –
for example in Joyce, Eliot, Yeats or Auden, to
mention some illustrious paradigm-cases.
Such research is of course highly respectable:
I know the frustrations and rewards, the pains
and satisfactions that accompany it, and I am
fully aware that it is necessary to the
advancement of knowledge. But knowledge
is not my concern here, nor is erudition, since
what I have been trying to describe as the
intertextual effect takes us to the edge of what
Eliot called “the unnamed feelings which form
the substratum of our being,”61 and to the brink
of the truth of which, at the very end of his
life, Yeats said: “Man can embody [it] but he
cannot know it.62 Erudition must know its
place. For lovers of poetic language, writers
and readers of poems, erudition is all very well
so long as it “will not”, as Eliot puts it,
“encroach upon [their] necessary receptivity
and necessary laziness.”63 We are all
conditioned by the same cultural, intertextual
“deposits,” and “to say that one draws upon
such deposits,” says David Jones, “does not
imply erudition; it suggests only that these form
the materia that we all draw upon, whether
we know it or not […], whether we are
lettered or illiterate.”64 The intertextual effect,
however, is only one of the ways in which
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poetic language manages to combine what
Jacques Lacan calls “effet de sens” and “effet
de trou” – to produce in the same movement
meaning and the exemption of meaning, its
absence, lack or “hole.” Rhythm, rhyme and
metaphor also contribute to Jakobson’s poetic
function of language; they also “promot[e] the
palpability of signs,”65 and like the intertextual
effect they tend to make us suddenly feel
language again as something enigmatic,
unheimlich, uncanny, other, and yet obscurely
and intimately entwined with that core of darkness
in us which Freud calls the unconscious. In “The
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Figure a Poem Makes” Robert Frost says of the
poetic effect: “For me the initial delight is in the
surprise of remembering something I didn’t
know I knew.”66 Among the scraps, orts,
fragments of jouissance which now and again I
receive as gifts from the intertext, some are
likewise caused by my remembering something
I didn’t know I knew, others by the uncertain
feeling that in the word-hoard of my forgetful
memory, on the tip of my brain’s hippocampus,
there lies something I know but cannot
remember of the great memory of  literature.
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